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Abstract 
 
A much discussed feature of Grice’s (1957) account of intentional communication is the line he 
drew between showing and meaningNN, where meaningNN typically involves a linguistic 
convention or code. This distinction has had substantial effects on the development of 
pragmatics: pragmatists have focused on the notion of meaningNN and abstracted away from 
cases of showing. This paper explores the central differences between Gricean meaningNN 
intentions and relevance theory intentions. Firstly, relevance theory does not attempt to draw the 
line Grice drew, and recognises both showing and meaningNN as instances of overt intentional or 
ostensive-inferential communication. Rather than there being a sharp cut-off point between the 
two notions, there is a continuum of cases in between. Secondly, in contrast to the kind of 
intention proposed by Grice, the relevance-theoretic informative intention is not characterised as 
an intention to modify the hearer’s thoughts directly—‘to produce a particular response r’. This 
intention, it is argued, is not always reducible to an intention to communicate simply a single 
proposition and propositional attitude (or even a small set). This second move sheds new light on 
how better to analyse some of the weaker, vaguer aspects of communication, including the 
communication of impressions, emotions, attitudes, feelings and sensations. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The spirit of Paul Grice continues to exert a powerful influence. Not only was his work among 
the most influential in laying the foundations on which much of modern pragmatics is built, but 
his insights continue to provoke debate. We may owe the term ‘pragmatics’ to Charles Morris 
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(1938), but Grice certainly ranks highly among a select few to whom credit is due for shaping –
and continuing to shape – the discipline as we know it today. 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, Wilson and Sperber 2004) is one of 
several modern approaches to pragmatics that builds on Gricean foundations. It combines aspects 
of a Gricean intention-based approach with modern research in psychology and cognitive science 
to provide a cognitive-inferential framework. Central to any intention-based approach, of course, 
are the kind of intentions involved. The aim of this paper, then, is to explore the two central 
differences between Gricean intentions and relevance-theoretic intentions. 
Firstly, a much discussed feature of Grice’s account of intentional communication is the line 
he drew between showing and non-natural meaning (meaningNN), where meaningNN typically 
involves a linguistic convention or code. This distinction has had substantial effects on the 
development of pragmatics: pragmatists have focused on the notion of meaningNN and abstracted 
away from cases of showing. Relevance theory does not attempt to draw a similar line to Grice’s, 
and recognises both showing and meaningNN as instances of overt intentional or ostensive-
inferential communication. Rather than there being a sharp cut-off point between the two notions, 
there is a continuum of cases in between. 
Secondly, in contrast to the kind of intention proposed by Grice, the relevance-theoretic 
informative intention is not characterised as an intention to modify the hearer’s thoughts 
directly—‘to produce a particular response r’. This intention, it is argued, is not always 
analysable as an intention to communicate simply a single proposition and propositional attitude 
(or even a small set). This second move sheds new light on how better to analyse some of the 
weaker, vaguer aspects of communication, including the communication of impressions, 
emotions, attitudes, feelings and sensations. 
 3 
In Section 2 I introduce the notion of meaningNN Grice first outlined in his 1957 paper, paying 
particular attention to the line he drew between cases of meaningNN and cases of ‘deliberately and 
openly showing’. In Section 3 I look at some of the intuitions which make aspects of this account 
problematic. This leads on to the discussion in Section 4, in which I explore the two principal 
differences between Gricean meaningNN intentions and relevance-theoretic intentions as 
summarized above. In the final section I look at some more theoretical, as well as some of the 
practical, implications of exploring the role of intentions in human mental life. 
 
2. Gricean intentions
 
To pragmatists, indeed linguists generally, Grice is remembered best for his Theory of 
Conversation, which he outlined in the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University 
in 1967. Whilst this and his Theory of Meaning are often regarded as distinct, they are not 
unrelated. Indeed, it could be argued that the two theories are mutually illuminating to the extent 
that we fail to do justice to either if we consider them independently of one another (see Neale 
1992 for discussion). 
It might also be noted that Grice’s Theory of Conversation and his Theory of Meaning were 
but one part of a much larger programme; a programme Grice never finished (nor indeed could 
ever have hoped to). On the back cover of Grice’s 1989 anthology Studies in the Way of Words, 
Simon Blackburn describes Grice as ‘a miniaturist who changed the way other people paint big 
canvases’. I respectfully disagree; while it’s easy to form the impression that Grice was a 
miniaturist because of the capacity he had for taking infinite pains, I think that misses the point 
that, actually, the canvas he envisaged in forming his work was—to coin a phrase used by Daniel 
Dennett—‘Vanishingly Vast’ (1995: 109). His work on reasoning and rationality (much of which 
was published only in 2001) has not yet been fully explored and I will suggest towards the end of 
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this paper that in many ways it anticipates current discussion in cognitive science on ‘fast and 
frugal heuristics’ (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999).  
By way of focussing the discussion on meaningNN, Grice began his 1957 paper by contrasting 
it with cases of natural meaning (meaningN) and. See (1) and (2) below: 
 
(1) Those spots meanN  measles. 
(2) That remark meansNN he has measles. 
 
He then proposed a variety of ways in which the two types of meaning might be distinguished 
before turning to the question that was central to the paper: how the kind of meaning exemplified 
in (2) might be characterised in terms of intentions and the recognition of intentions.2 He moved 
through a series of carefully-constructed examples in order to identify precisely the type of 
intentions that are required (1989: 217): 
 
“A first shot would be to suggest that “x meantNN something” would be true if x was intended 
by its utterer to induce a belief in some “audience” and that to say what the belief was would 
be to say what x meantNN. This will not do. I might drop B’s handkerchief near the scene of a 
murder in order to induce the detective to believe that B is the murderer; but we should not 
want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meantNN anything or that I had 
meantNN by leaving it that B was the murderer.” 
 
The problem in this case is that the handkerchief-dropper’s intentions are entirely incidental to 
the detective’s response. The two are not linked. Nor can they be, since the ‘audience’ is entirely 
unaware of the handkerchief-dropper’s intentions. Grice then turns to a series of further 
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examples, where—in contrast to the above example—an individual openly (henceforth overtly) 
provides evidence of their intention to induce a belief (1989: 218): 
 
“Clearly we must at least add that, for x to have meantNN anything, not merely must it have 
been “uttered” with the intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have 
intended the “audience” to recognize the intention behind the utterance. […] 
[(A)]3 Herod presents Salome with the head of St. John the Baptist on a charger. 
[(B)] Feeling faint, a child lets its mother see how pale it is (hoping that she may draw her 
own conclusions and help). 
[(C)] I leave the china my daughter has broken lying around for my wife to see.” 
 
For Grice, however, a problem remained. There is still a sense in the above examples in 
which the respective individual’s intentions are at least partly incidental to the intended response 
being induced in the audience. In (A), for example, Salome can infer that St. John the Baptist is 
dead solely on the strength of the evidence presented, and independent of any intentions Herod 
has in presenting her with his head (similar remarks carry over to (B) and (C)). Grice wanted to 
distinguish between merely (albeit overtly) drawing someone’s attention to a particular object or 
a certain type of behaviour—‘showing’, which in his view did not amount to the object or 
behaviour meaningNN anything (or anything being meantNN by the ‘shower’), and something 
being meantNN by the object or behaviour in question (or by the person using the object or 
behaviour in a meaningfulNN manner) (1989: 218): 
 
“What we want to find is the difference between “deliberately and openly letting someone 
know” and “telling”, and between “getting someone to think” and “telling”. 
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The way out is perhaps as follows. Compare the following two cases: 
 
(1) I show Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X. 
(2) I draw a picture of Mr. Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr. X. 
 
I find that I want to deny that in (1) the photograph (or my showing it to Mr. X) meantNN 
anything at all, while I want to assert that in (2) the picture (or my drawing and showing it) 
meantNN something (that Mr. Y had been unduly familiar), or at least that I had meantNN by it 
that Mr. Y had been unduly familiar. What is the difference between the two cases? Surely 
that in case (1) Mr. X’s recognition of my intention to make him believe that there is 
something between Mr. Y and Mrs. X is (more or less) irrelevant to the production of this 
effect by the photograph. Mr. X would be led by the photograph at least to suspect Mrs. X 
even if, instead of showing it to him, I had left it in his room by accident; and I (the 
photograph shower) would not be unaware of this. But it will make a difference to the effect 
of my picture on Mr. X whether or not he takes me to be intending to inform him (make him 
believe something) about Mrs. X, and not to be just doodling or trying to produce a work of 
art.” 
 
In an act carried out in which evidence is provided of an intention to ‘induce a response’ or to 
‘inform’, note that there are two layers to be retrieved by the audience. The first, basic layer is the 
information being pointed out—in Grice’s example, the fact that Mr. Y is indeed being unduly 
familiar with Mrs. X, and the second, the information that this first layer is being pointed out 
intentionally. In examples (A), (B) and (C) from the quote above, the communicator (Herod, the 
child, Grice) provides overt evidence of their intention to inform (the second layer), but in these 
cases the basic layer of information is derivable without reference to this intention. For a case to 
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count as one of meaningNN, this basic layer should not be entirely derivable without reference to 
the second layer and, furthermore, this should be intended. Grice concludes his formulation of 
meaningNN as follows: 
 
““A meant something by x” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of 
inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention”.” 
 
This he later modified to the following (see Grice 1989: 92): 
 
“‘U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending: 
(1) A to produce a particular response r 
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) 
A to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilment of (2).” 
 
Notice first, that the change appears to mark a move from a self-referential, ‘reflexive’ 
intention to a finite series of ‘iterated’ intentions. Grice himself was somewhat inconsistent on 
this issue, perhaps due to a sensitivity to the possibility of a reflexive paradox (see the subtle 
debate between Recanati 1986 and Bach 1987) and his precise intentions are unclear. Sperber and 
Wilson (1985/1996) argue that reflexive intentions are psychologically implausible and favour 
the finite iterated approach.4,5 
 
3.  Showing and meaning 
Grice’s formulation of meaningNN inspired a great deal of discussion. On the one hand, 
philosophers (including Strawson 1964, Searle 1965, 1969, 1979, Schiffer 1972) constructed a 
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range of complex counter-examples. Many of these counter-examples lead commentators to posit 
the presence of ever higher-levels of intentionality (which rapidly induce—in me at least—an 
unsettling form of psychic vertigo) . These, and some of the possible solutions to them, are neatly 
summarised by Avramides (1989).6 
However, there is another way in which the above formulation might be challenged, and it is 
this way I would like to explore. Instead of focussing on intentions over and above the basic 
intentions proposed by Grice, it looks within the formulation itself, and in particular at clause (3) 
of the above reformulation: the central role Grice saw for the second layer—the intention to 
inform—in deriving the first. 
Schiffer addresses this point in his 1972 book ‘Meaning’ (1972: 56): 
 
“[O]ne thing that might be said is that in presenting Salome with the head of St. John the 
Baptist, Herod might mean that St. John the Baptist was dead. This does not strike me as a 
wildly implausible thing to say. Consider an analogous case. 
 
(3a) A: “Let’s play squash.” 
S: Holds up bandaged leg. 
 
Here, I think, one would say, intuitively, that by holding up his leg S meant that he could not 
play, or that he could not play because his leg was injured; yet it would seem that the only 
difference between (3) [(A)—the Herod, Salome and St. John the Baptist example—TW] and 
(3a) which is possibly relevant is that the “inference” A has to make in the “bandaged leg” 
example is slightly less direct than in the case of St. John the Baptist’s head, although in both 
cases one could make the relevant inference without any assistance on the part of S. 
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Grice has objected to me that while we may say that (in (3a)) S meant he could not play 
squash by holding up his bandaged leg, he could not mean thereby that his leg is bandaged. 
But, in the first place, even this is not an objection to the point I am trying to make, which is 
that there is no relevant difference between (3) and (3a), so that if we may say that S meant 
that he could not play squash, then—by parity of reason—we may say that Herod meant that 
St. John the Baptist was dead (it was not suggested that Herod meant that there was a severed 
head on his charger). In the second place, I think that it is false that S could not mean that his 
leg was bandaged by holding up his bandaged leg. Consider (3b): 
 
(3b) A: “I’ve heard that your leg is bandaged. Is it true?” 
 S: Holds up bandaged leg. 
 
Here, I think, one would say that S meant that his leg was bandaged.” 
 
Schiffer’s argument, then, is that cases such as (1) from the above quote (the photograph 
example)—and, indeed, cases such as (A), (B) and (C) from the quote before that—should be 
regarded as instances of meaningNN.7 
My argument will run along similar lines, although as I mentioned in my introduction, the 
aim of relevance-theorists is to try and characterise overt intentional communication, not 
meaningNN. While Schiffer focuses on the St. John the Baptist example (A), I will focus on an 
example parallel to example (B). For a communicative act to be intentional, I will argue, the 
important thing is that evidence is provided of an intention to inform, and not whether in the 
absence of such an intention, an audience might have been able to draw their own conclusions. 
As I will show, the very fact that a communicator has provided evidence of an intention to inform 
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will encourage the audience to make ‘less direct’ inferences: an act of intentional communication 
comes with certain expectations. 
Consider (3a-e) below. In all these cases something has happened that has produced a 
response in an audience: 
 
(3a) Mary is asleep. Her mother can see for herself that Mary’s arm is covered in a rash 
and concludes that she is unwell. 
(3b) Feeling unwell, Mary lies in bed with her eyes closed. She intends her mother to see 
her rash but really doesn’t mind whether or not this intention is noticed. 
(3c) The same as (3b), except that here Mary’s mother instinctively guesses at Mary’s 
intention that her mother sees her rash. 
(3d)  Feeling unwell, Mary let’s out a spontaneous groan, and deliberately and openly lets 
her mother see her rash so she will notice and help.  
(3e) Mary says to her mother ‘I don’t feel well’. 
 
As I have pointed out, Grice noticed that before we can be said to be dealing with a case of 
meaningNN certain intentions must be present. Firstly, the response must be intended—this rules 
out (3a) as a case of meaningNN; secondly, the audience must recognise the intention to produce 
that response—this rules out (3b); thirdly, the communicator must intend that the audience should 
recognise the intention to produce that response—this rules out (3c). The final all-important 
condition, the one that rules out (3d), and makes (3e) a case of meaningNN, is that only in this 
example does Mary intend that the recognition of her intention to produce the desired response 
will play a crucial role in producing the response itself.  In (3d) Mary’s mother can see for herself 
that Mary is unwell: the rash provides direct evidence of that fact. 
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No one would propose that the scenario described in (3a) is a case of intentional 
communication. As far as her mother is concerned, Mary is asleep: she does not intend to 
communicate anything. This might be better described as a case of accidental information 
transmission: it is Mary’s rash that shows her mother that she is unwell, not Mary. In fact, even to 
propose that this is communication is to use the word extremely broadly. Intuitively, we would be 
loath to say that an individual walking down the street ‘communicates’ every piece of 
information a passer-by might infer from his physical appearance, his demeanour, his clothes, his 
gait etc. 
It is less obvious in (3b) and (3c) that we are not dealing with full-blown intentional 
communication. After all, Mary does intend to inform her mother of something. However, she is 
not being open about this informative intention, and while she might indeed be said to be 
communicating intentionally, she is certainly doing so covertly. 
But what of the cases in (3d) and (3e)? While there is certainly a sense in which Mary’s 
mother can see Mary’s rash and draw her own conclusions irrespective of Mary’s intentions, I 
think that there are good reasons to suggest that (3d) might be regarded as an instance of overt 
intentional communication (though this concept needs to be distinguished from meaningNN). 
This, as I will illustrate in the next section, is the view that relevance theory takes. 
Firstly, Mary is being ‘deliberate and open’ about the intentions she has. Even if she only 
intended to inform her mother that she was feeling unwell, by being ‘deliberate and open’ she is 
certainly being overt about her informative intention, rather than covert as in (3b) and (3c). There 
is a clear sense in which it is Mary showing her mother she is unwell, rather than just her rash. 
Secondly, and more importantly, notice that Mary does not just intend to inform her mother that 
she is unwell, but also that she wants her mother to help. If Mary’s mother does in fact infer this, 
I think we would be loath to say that her inference is entirely down to her having drawn her own 
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conclusions, and not—to some extent at least—the result of inferring intentions Mary had in 
behaving in the way she did. For in general, someone who is ‘deliberately and openly’ letting 
someone know something creates the expectation in their audience that they have done so for a 
reason: in order to have their informative intention fulfilled, a communicator must first let her 
audience know that she has such an intention in the first place. This reflects the point made by 
Schiffer in the quote above: the inference from ‘Mary has a rash’ to ‘Mary wants help’ is less 
direct than the inference from ‘Mary has a rash’ to ‘Mary is unwell’. The motivation for making 
this less direct inference is the very fact that Mary—by acting deliberately and openly—has 
created an expectation in her mother that there is something extra to infer. 
 
4. Relevance theoretic intentions 
4.1 MeaningNN and intentional communication 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, Blakemore 2002, Wilson and Sperber 2004) 
builds on Gricean foundations. It combines aspects of a Gricean intention-based pragmatics with 
aspects of modern psychological research and cognitive science to provide a cognitive-inferential 
pragmatic framework, which is an abstract model of a communicator’s performance. It takes as 
its domain a carefully defined sub-set of those cases that might—in folk terminology at least—be 
referred to as instances of communication. ‘Communication’ itself is a broad notion. Sebeok 
(1972: 39) remarks that: 
 
“…all organic alliances presuppose a measure of communication: Protozoa interchange 
signals; an aggregate of cells becomes an organism by virtue of the fact that the component 
cells can influence one another.” 
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Construed in this way, our pragmatic theory would indeed have to be what Chomsky (2000) 
termed a ‘theory of everything’; it would be required to encompass every possible facet of human 
interaction that might conceivably be said to be (in Sebeok’s terms) ‘communicative’; from 
socio-cultural right down to sub-personal phenomena: from fashion to pheromones. 
Relevance theory has a carefully delimited domain; it is not a ‘theory of everything’; it is not 
even a theory of communication per se, and focuses on a sub-type of human communicative 
behaviour: behaviour by which a communicator provides evidence that they intend to 
communicate something. Natural language is seen as governed by a code, itself governed by an 
autonomous mental grammar. Utterance interpretation, on the other hand, is a two-stage process. 
The linguistically encoded logical form, which is the output of the mental grammar, is simply a 
starting point for rich inferential processes guided by the expectation that speakers conform to 
certain standards or expectations; that in (highly) intuitive terms, an audience knows that a 
communicator has a good reason for providing the stimulus which attracts attention to their 
intention to communicate, and that that reason is a good enough one for an audience to attend to 
it. In contrast with conscious, reflective reasoning, it is proposed that these inferential processes 
are unconscious and fast, under-pinned by ‘fast and frugal heuristics’ of the kind currently 
gaining much currency in cognitive science (see Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group 
1999). 
Relevance theory is based on a definition of relevance and two general principles: a Cognitive 
and a Communicative Principle of Relevance (for a recent accounts see Wilson and Sperber 
2004). Relevance is characterised in cost-benefit terms, as a property of inputs to cognitive 
processes, the benefits being positive cognitive effects, and the cost the processing effort needed 
to achieve these effects. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects 
achieved by processing an input in a context of available assumptions, and the smaller the 
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processing effort required, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual who processes 
it.  
The human disposition to search for relevance is seen as an evolved consequence of the 
tendency toward greater efficiency in cognition (Sperber and Wilson 2002). In Dan Sperber’s 
words (1996: 114): 
 
“Cognitive efficiency involves making the right choices in selecting which available new 
attention to attend to and which available past information to process it with. The right 
choices in this respect consist in bringing together input and memory information, the joint 
processing of which will provide as much cognitive effect as possible for as little effort as 
possible.” 
 
Or, as Gigerenzer and Todd (1999: 21) put it: ‘There is a point where too much information and 
too much information processing can hurt. Cognition is the art of focusing on the relevant and 
deliberately ignoring the rest’. 
The disposition to search for relevance is one that is routinely exploited in human 
communication. Since speakers know that listeners will pay attention only to stimuli that are 
relevant enough, in order to attract and hold an audience’s attention they should make their 
communicative stimuli appear at least relevant enough to be worth processing. More precisely, 
the Communicative Principle of Relevance claims that by overtly displaying an intention to 
inform—producing an utterance or other ostensive stimulus—a communicator creates a 
presumption that the stimulus is at least relevant enough to be worth processing, and moreover, 
the most relevant one compatible with her own abilities and preferences. Recall from the last 
section that the motivation for making the kind of ‘less direct’ inferences I discussed there is the 
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very fact that a communicator has created in her audience an expectation that there is something 
worth their while to infer. Relevance theory is an attempt to flesh out the notion of what makes 
communicated information worthwhile. 
As has already been pointed out, in contrast to Grice’s (1957) aim of characterising 
meaningNN, relevance theory aims at providing a characterisation of human overt intentional 
communication generally. Utterances, after all, are not the only kind of ostensive stimuli, and a 
communicator might provide evidence of her intention to inform by means of a look, a gesture, or 
even a natural sign (such as the above scenario, in which Mary openly shows her mother her 
rash). Ostensive stimuli are, more often than not, a mixture of what Grice would have called 
natural and non-natural meaning, and this is one of the reasons that relevance theory does not 
attempt to draw the line that Grice wanted to between ‘“deliberately and openly letting someone 
know” and “telling”’ (1989: 218). 
Indeed, to deny, as Grice does, that the overt showing of spontaneously-produced natural 
behaviours is a case of meaningNN would be to exclude it from the domain of pragmatics.  Yet 
there seem to be clear cases where the open showing of spontaneously-produced natural signs 
and signals makes a difference to the speaker’s meaning (see Wilson and Wharton 2006 for 
discussion). Take, for example, an utterance of (4). 
 
   (4) Peter is late. 
 
If the utterer of (4) makes no attempt to conceal the spontaneous anger in her facial expression 
and tone of voice, and hence ‘deliberately and openly shows’ it, she would naturally be 
understood as meaning not only that Peter was late but that she was angry that he was late. 
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Grice’s framework appears to exclude such spontaneous expressions of emotion from 
contributing to a speaker’s meaning in the sense he was trying to define. 
Recall the characterization in Section 2: in any act carried out with the intention of revealing 
an informative intention, there are two layers of information to be retrieved. The first, basic layer 
is the information being pointed out, and the second is the information that the first layer is being 
pointed out intentionally. What makes an individual ostensive act a case of either ‘showing’ or 
‘meaningNN’ is the precise nature of the evidence provided for the first layer. In cases of showing, 
the evidence provided is relatively direct—Schiffer’s bandaged leg, for example. In cases of 
meaningNN, the evidence provided is relatively indirect—a linguistic utterance, for example. 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 53) discuss the relationship between the two notions: 
 
“Is there a dividing line between instances of ostension which one would be more inclined to 
describe as “showing something”, and clear cases of communication where the 
communicator unquestionably “means something”?… What we have tried to show… is that 
there are not two distinct and well-defined classes, but a continuum of cases of ostension 
ranging from “showing”, where strong direct evidence for the basic layer of information is 
provided, to “saying that”, where all the evidence is indirect…” 
 
This is the first major difference between Gricean and relevance-theoretic intentions, and has 
clear implications for what should be seen as the domain of pragmatic principles or maxims, for 
it suggests that they are best seen as applying to the domain of overt intentional communication 
as a whole, rather to the domain of meaningNN. Relevance theory, then, recognises both showing 
and meaningNN as instances of overt intentional or—as they term it—ostensive-inferential 
communication. Most cases of showing—cases in which the evidence provided is fairly direct—
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still require an extra layer of inference before the communicator’s full informative intention is 
recognised8 (recall that in example (3d) above) Mary’s mother still has to make the less direct 
inference that Mary wants help), and the extent to which an audience is required to make this 
extra inference is a question of degree. 
Consider the following scenario in the light of Grice’s photograph example. Imagine I am a 
private detective, hired by Mr. X to follow Mrs. X in order to confirm or disconfirm his suspicion 
that she is having an affair with Mr. Y. I have managed to take a photograph of Mrs. X and Mr. Y 
together. The quality is poor—there was too little light, I used a telephoto lens, there is a hint of 
camera-shake etc.—and a blurred image of the couple can only just be seen. 
There is a subtle, but clear, difference between my photograph example and Grice’s original 
one. For if I leave my photograph in Mr. X’s room by accident, it is no longer absolutely clear 
that Mr. X’s coming across the photo will have the same effect on him as would my showing it to 
him. It is only by close inspection that he could even see this was a photo of Mrs. X and Mr. Y, 
so it may only be in virtue of my showing it to him that Mr. X would take the time and effort to 
look at the photograph closely enough to make out exactly who the photo shows. In other words, 
whether or not the photograph has the effect I desire may well depend on Mr. X’s successful 
recognition of my intention to produce some effect on him by means of the recognition of that 
intention. 
It could of course be responded that the degree to which Mr. X is required to attribute 
intentions to me in this scenario is minimal. Nonetheless, the requirement is there, and it seems 
clear that the recognition of my intention to inform Mr. X does indeed play some role, however 
minimally, in accounting for the effect of my photograph on him. 
Consider another scenario. This time, as well as being a private detective, I am also a keen 
amateur photographer. I have taken another (this time, much better) photo of Mrs. X and Mr. Y, 
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and I have developed it myself. I am proud of the framing of the couple within the shot, as well 
as the colour, the contrast and the general quality of the print. I show a friend of mine the 
photograph of Mr. Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X. How does my friend respond? In the 
context of the scenarios provided so far, the tendency is to suggest that my friend would probably 
remark something like ‘My goodness, Mr. Y is certainly having an affair with Mrs. X’, or even ‘I 
hope you’re going to show this to Mr. X’. Suppose, however, that I tell you the friend referred to 
above us is a professional photographer. Suddenly, a variety of other responses may be 
appropriate: ‘The framing of that couple is great’ or ‘I love the colour, contrast, quality of the 
light etc.’ or ‘Aren’t those new polarisers terrific?’ or ‘So you’ve finally built your own dark-
room’. And what does my colleague’s response depend on? What he takes my intention to be in 
showing him the photograph. 
Actually, I think the point can be made even more clearly. You are walking down the street 
and a complete stranger comes up to you and thrusts a photograph in front of your face. Having 
recovered from the initial shock, most people would probably react in the same way: with utter 
confusion. Of course, like me, you might say ‘Very nice!’ or ‘How fascinating!’ but that would 
only be because you thought that by responding in such a way you might get rid of this mad 
photograph-shower. Actually, I bet most people wouldn’t know what to think, the problem being 
that although it would be perfectly clear that you were being shown a photograph, it would be far 
from clear exactly what it was you were being shown a photograph of (or what you were being 
shown the photograph for).9 
And although it requires a slight stretching of the imagination, even in Grice’s original 
photograph example (the comparison between (1) and (2) above) is there not a sense in which 
Mr. X must attribute to the photograph-shower the intentions behind his showing it? It will, after 
all, make a difference to the effect of the picture on Mr. X whether or not he takes the shower to 
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be intending to inform him about Mrs. X and Mr. Y, and not to be just showing him the quality of 
the colour, or the light, or the new polariser he has invested in. As Deirdre Wilson pointed out to 
me in conversation, even if two individuals A and B are in the same room as two other people—
for the sake of convenience Mrs. X and Mr. Y—engaged in (as she put it) ‘unfaithful activities’, 
there will still be at least some degree of intention-attribution involved if A attempts to point out 
something about them to B: other things being equal, you might just as easily be pointing out 
something Mr. Y is (or isn’t) wearing, as drawing attention to the inappropriateness of their 
behaviour. Not only, then, can what is meantNN only be regarded as a sub-set of what is 
intentionally communicated, but rather than the dichotomy Grice envisaged in his 1957 paper, 
there is a continuum of cases between showing and meaningNN. 
The continuum between showing and meaningNN has a variety of applications. At various 
points along it, we can see the varying extents to which hearers are required to consider intentions 
of speakers in order to get from the evidence they provide to the first, basic layer of information 
they are communicating. It therefore provides a ‘snapshot’ of the types of evidence used in 
intentional communicative acts and the role inference plays in them. At one extreme of the 
continuum lie clear cases of spontaneous, natural display; at the other extreme lie clear cases of 
linguistic coding, where all the evidence provided for the first, basic layer is indirect. In between 
lie a range of cases in which more or less direct ‘natural’ evidence and more or less indirect 
coded evidence mix to various degrees: for example, in pointing and stylised expressions of 
emotion. Equally importantly, the continuum provides a theoretical tool which allows us to 
conceptualise more clearly the observation made above that ostensive stimuli are often highly 
complex composites of different, inter-related behaviours which fall at various points between 
‘showing’ and ‘meaningNN’.  In Wilson and Wharton (2006) these observations are brought to 
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bear on the analysis of prosody. Wharton (forthcoming) applies them to non-verbal behaviours in 
general.  
 
4.2 Weak communication 
It could of course be objected that we run the risk of allowing into the domain of pragmatic 
principles or mechanisms all manner of cases in which what is communicated is either so weak or 
so vague that it cannot be adequately characterised. The response, I suggest, is that overt 
communication often is weak and vague, and that a theory of human intentional communication 
should at least try to accommodate these vaguer aspects. As we saw in Section 2, there are 
examples which are clearly cases of intentional communication that do not qualify as cases of 
meaningNN according to Grice’s definitions; we now see that—even if we wanted make a 
distinction—there is no convenient cut-off point between the two where such a distinction might 
be drawn. If we attempt to limit our attention to cases that are uncontroversially cases of 
meaningNN, then we are forced to ignore a whole range of communicative exchanges that deserve 
explanation. 
To help account for the vaguer aspects of communication, including the communication of 
impressions, emotions, attitudes, feelings and sensations, Sperber and Wilson propose that the 
informative intention might be better characterised as an intention to modify not the hearer’s 
thoughts directly, but his cognitive environment: this includes not only all the facts or 
assumptions that he is aware of, but also all the facts or assumptions he is capable of becoming 
aware of, in his physical environment—in relevance-theoretic terms, the set of facts that are 
manifest to him (i.e. that he is capable of perceiving or inferring). This notion of manifestness 
plays a central role in the relevance-theoretic characterisation of an informative intention, which 
is defined not in Gricean terms, as an intention ‘to produce a particular response r’, but rather as 
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an intention ‘to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I’ (Sperber 
and Wilson 1986/1995: 58). This is the second major difference between Gricean and relevance-
theoretic intentions.  The notion of ‘manifestness’ is central to the relevance-theoretic notion of a 
communicative intention, defined as an intention ‘to to make it mutually manifest to audience 
and communicator that the communicator has [an] informative intention’ (ibid: 61). The 
psychologically-plausible notion of mutual manifestness is part of the relevance-theoretic 
solution to the problems with Grice’s original three-clause definition of meaningNN raised by 
(among others) Strawson 1964 and Schiffer 1972. 
An assumption may be manifest to different degrees. The more salient a manifest assumption, 
and hence the more likely to be mentally represented, the more strongly it is manifest. Vague 
communication typically involves a marginal increase in the manifestness of a very wide range of 
weakly manifest assumptions, resulting in an increased similarity between the cognitive 
environments of communicator and audience. 
Consider the following example. A man and a woman arrive by ferry at a Greek island. It is 
the first time she has been here. They disembark. Having scanned the quayside, he smiles at her; 
then he looks back ostensively to the quayside again, urging her to look too. She gazes along the 
quayside. What is he drawing her attention to? Is it the taverna at the water’s edge, the octopus 
drying in the breeze, the ragged cats sniffing the nets, the bougainvillea in the kastro, the brilliant 
light? Is it one, many or all of these things? 
But she does not turn to him and say ‘What do you mean?’ She acknowledges him and smiles 
back, because she understands. The sights, sounds and smells perceivable in her physical 
environment interact with her inferential abilities and her memories to alter her cognitive 
environment, making it possible for her to have further thoughts, memories and feelings similar 
to his own. This is all that he intended: to convey an impression. He did not mean any one thing; 
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his intention cannot be pinned down to one specific proposition or small set of propositions; it 
was simply to make more manifest to her whatever assumptions became manifest to him as he 
scanned the quayside. 
On other occasions, when the intention might be to communicate something equally 
intangible, and equally hard to spell out in words—emotions or feelings—it might also be 
preferable to use a behaviour that falls somewhere between showing and meaning or saying. 
Given the vagueness of some of the ostensive stimuli that constitute cases of ‘showing’, it seems 
clear that this intention is not always reducible to an intention to communicate simply a single 
proposition and propositional attitude (or even a small set). I have argued (Wharton 2003ab) that 
interjections such as aha, wow and ouch, and non-verbal behaviours generally, are often used to 
communicate in similarly vague ways, marginally increasing the manifestness of a very wide 
range of assumptions. 
These differences are captured within relevance theory by distinguishing strong from weak 
communication, and strong from weak implicatures. A conclusion is strongly implicated (or is a 
strong implicature) to the extent that it (or some closely similar proposition) must be derived in 
the course of constructing a satisfactory interpretation (i.e. one that satisfies the hearer’s 
expectation of relevance). It is weakly implicated if its recovery helps with the construction of a 
satisfactory interpretation, but is not essential because the utterance provides evidence for a wide 
array of roughly similar conclusions, any of which would do (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95, 
Wilson and Sperber 2002). Typically, a spoken utterance involves a mixture of strong and weak 
communication. 
 
5. Intentions made ‘real’ 
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“The words “know” and “feel” were like “it” and “of” and “by”—you couldn’t see them or 
touch them, so the meaning wasn’t significant. People cannot show you a “know” and you 
cannot see what a “feel” looks like.” 
  (Donna Williams—Somebody Somewhere) 
 
According to the accounts of communication adopted by Grice and relevance theory, linguistic 
communication is an intelligent, intentional, inferential activity. Utterances do not encode the 
messages speakers want to convey; rather, they are used to provide evidence of intentions, which 
hearers must infer. I have nonetheless tried to tease out the differences between the kind of 
intentions involved in both theoretical accounts. 
But intentions are not mere theoretical tools. Other people’s intentions are a very ‘real’ part of 
our everyday mental lives. The human disposition to attribute mental states is so much a part of 
our individual (or collective, species-specific) psychological make-up that it is not something we 
can choose to do or not to do: it’s something we just can’t help, any more than we can help 
pulling our hand back from a source of extreme heat.  
Plainly, other people’s intentions (indeed, mental states generally) are not objects to be 
perceived in the world in the same way as are their faces or bodies; they are ‘out there’, but they 
are invisible.10 It is hard, however, to even imagine what it would be like not to be able to sense 
the mental states of others in some way. The world would be such a different, potentially 
terrifying place. The human thumb accounts for over 50% of the function of the human hand; we 
can touch it, we can see it and we can feel it. Yet it is still very difficult to imagine how we might 
cope without one. In the case of our thumb, of course, we are given a salutary reminder each time 
we injure it—just try tying your shoelace, or riding a bike with a sprained thumb. In the case of 
what it would like to be unable to attribute mental states we are left with thought experiments of 
the kind suggested by Baron-Cohen (1992: 1-5) and the few first-hand accounts of what it is 
really like. Indeed, the central role the recognition of intentions plays in human interaction 
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generally is no more clearly illustrated than by the accounts of those individuals for whom the 
mental states of others, rather than being merely out of sight, are locked away—permanently out 
of reach (Williams 1992, 1994, 1999; Holliday Willey 1999; see also Happé 1992 on the 
autobiographical writings of three Asperger syndrome adults, and Sacks 1994). 
 The author of the above epigraph—Donna Williams—is autistic. Her autobiographical works 
Nobody Nowhere, Somebody Somewhere and Like Colour to the Blind are vivid accounts of what 
it is like to be mindblind—to use the term adopted by Simon Baron-Cohen (1995). Donna’s 
world is a strange, unfamiliar, frightening one: a world of ‘inner isolation’, of ‘persistent 
aloneness’ (1994: 95); a world it took enormous strength and courage to escape. 
Our understanding of autism is still limited but great strides have been made, and there is a 
growing literature on both the precise nature of the deficits and impairments that give rise to the 
condition, and the effects autism has on the capacity of autistic people to communicate and 
interact with other people (Leslie 1987, Happé 1994, Scholl and Leslie 1999). In this respect, 
work into the human capacity to attribute and express intentions forms the basis of a rich 
experimental literature. Baron-Cohen (1995) makes some concrete proposals about the specific 
deficits that might lie behind autism, and suggests that it is characterised by a (partial) breakdown 
in the mechanisms underlying the human mind-reading ability. His hypothesis is that autistic 
people exhibit a deficit in their Shared Attention Mechanism. This has two knock-on effects: 
firstly, it follows that they cannot construct complex three-place relations, such as ‘He sees (that) 
[I see her]’, and as a result cannot grasp that they and another person are attending to the same 
object; secondly, and more crucially, there is no output from the Shared Attention Mechanism to 
trigger the development of Theory of Mind Mechanism, which, it is claimed, is the mechanism 
underlying the human ability to attribute complex epistemic mental states (or propositional 
attitudes) such as ‘believe’ and ‘think’. 
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It is a recursive, metapsychological ability such as this that is exploited in cases of intentional 
communication. At this point, therefore, the border between Grice’s philosophy, modern 
cognitive science, psychology and (even) cognitive ethology becomes so blurred as to disappear. 
There is thus a point of contact (though, of course, agendas may vary) between the literature on 
intention-based pragmatic models that Grice’s work has inspired and recent psychological 
research on the capacity among humans and non-human animals to attribute mental states to one 
another.11 
It seems clear that the kind of meta-communicative abilities necessary for intentional 
communication in Grice’s sense and ostensive-inferential communication as defined in relevance 
theory are related to the wider meta-psychological mind-reading ability discussed above. There 
are reasons to explore the possibility, however, that there is more to the interpretive processes 
that underlie verbal comprehension (or, more generally, ostensive-inferential communication) 
than general mind-reading abilities. 
Firstly, the types of ‘meaning’ that a speaker can convey by producing an utterance are 
generally much more complex than the types of intention normally attributed to someone in order 
to explain their observed behaviour. Specialised mechanisms for the interpretation of speakers’ 
meanings appear therefore to be necessary. Secondly, we often attribute intentions to others by 
observing the effects of their actions, deciding which of those effects they might have desired, 
and attributing to them the intention to achieve those desired effects: for example, observing 
someone climb a tree and pick a fig, we may infer that his intention in climbing the tree was to 
pick a fig. However, a speaker will achieve very few effects by producing an utterance unless she 
is first understood, so the normal procedures for recognising the intentions behind ordinary non-
communicative actions won’t work: the hearer can’t first observe the effect of an utterance and 
then infer what it meant. Third, on broadly Gricean accounts of communication, in order to 
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understand intentional communication—as opposed to ordinary non-communicative behaviour—
it is necessary to be able to attribute several layers of metarepresentations; yet young children 
below the age of 4—the same children who (as do autistic people) fail standard mind-reading 
tests—master verbal communication quickly and effortlessly well before this age. 
These and other arguments (see Sperber and Wilson 2002, Wilson and Sperber 2004) have 
led to the proposal that the processes that underlie verbal comprehension might be performed by 
a specialised, domain-specific ‘comprehension’ mechanism  or sub-module (Sperber 2000), 
which may form part of the wider mind-reading ability. The task of such a mechanism would be 
to interpret ostensive stimuli according to the following relevance-based comprehension 
procedure (Sperber and Wilson 2002: 13), which is motivated by the Communicative Principle of 
Relevance. 
 
Relevance theoretic comprehension procedure 
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: 
Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, 
etc.) in order of accessibility. 
(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
 
Because a hearer can presume that a speaker will make her utterance as relevant as possible 
(and therefore as easy as possible to understand), he is justified in taking the path of least effort in 
interpreting that utterance. It is rational that hearers follow a path of least mental effort in looking 
for intended effects, which should make the utterance relevant enough. This may involve 
assigning reference and disambiguating, narrowing or loosening lexical meaning, supplying 
particular contextual assumptions in order to derive the expected level of effects, deriving strong 
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or weak implicatures. Once the hearer’s expectations of relevance are satisfied, it is reasonable 
for him to conclude that the meaning he has inferred was the one the communicator intended. 
Despite the fact that young children below the age of 4 regularly fail basic ‘first order’ theory 
of mind tests, there is some experimental evidence which suggests that they are able to track false 
beliefs in word-learning tasks before they can pass false belief tests (Happé and Loth 2002). This 
further supports the proposal that the mind-reading abilities which are a prerequisite for verbal 
communication dissociate to some degree from the wider human mind-reading ability; it also 
supports the hypothesis that there is a separate, comprehension module. 
The inferential processes required by the account described above are unconscious and fast, 
and the comprehension procedure can be seen as a ‘fast and frugal heuristic’. In this respect, then, 
the relevance-theoretic approach diverges once more from more traditional Gricean accounts of 
intentional communication (for example Grice 1989: 30-31)—indeed, from philosophical 
characterizations of utterance comprehension generally—which rationally reconstruct the 
comprehension process in the form of conscious and reflective inferences about the mental states 
of others. 
As a footnote, however, it’s worth noticing that in recently-published work (2001) Grice 
describes a view of inference in which inferential processes did not always have to be conscious 
and explicit: ‘we have... a ‘hard way’ of making inferential moves; [a] laborious, step-by-step 
procedure [which] consumes time and energy... A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, ... 
made possible by habituation and intention, is [also] available to us.’ (2001: 17). The spirit of 
Grice continues to exert a powerful influence.   
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NOTES 
                                               
1
 My thanks go to three anonymous reviewers for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are 
also due to Deirdre Wilson for her continued kindness and support. 
2
 The nature of the tests Grice devised to distinguish meaningN from meaningNN are not directly relevant to the 
discussion here. Elsewhere (see Wharton 2003b, forthcoming) I argue that meaningN has been somewhat overlooked 
in the literature on intentional communication and discuss these tests in more detail: speaker’s meaning, after all, is 
often a mixture of meaningN  and meaningNN. 
3
 I’ve changed Grice’s original (1), (2) and (3) here to (A), (B) and (C) respectively, to avoid confusion—the 
numerals (1) and (2) feature in the next quote. 
4
 Interested parties are directed to the Bach and Recanati papers, as well as the discussion in Sperber and Wilson 
(1985/1996). 
5
 In Lectures V, VI and VII of the William James Lectures (published as Grice (1968) and (1969)) Grice 
considered criticisms of the first of the above three clauses, which led him to make further modifications. This 
involved changing clause (1) to “‘U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x 
intending: ‘(1) A to think that U thinks that p”. The effect of this was to allow Grice to distinguish between 
utterances in which the intention is not to induce a belief, but rather to get the hearer to think that the speaker holds a 
particular belief, and utterances uttered with the further intention of getting the hearer to come to hold a belief (on the 
strength of the hearer thinking that the speaker holds a certain belief). Grice refers to these are exhibitive and 
protreptic utterances. (The latter are therefore protreptic as well as being exhibitive.) 
6
  According to Bach (1987: 147) much of this debate rests on the mistaken assumption that Grice’s M-intention 
is iterative and not—as Bach maintains—reflexive. 
7
 François Recanati also addresses this point, in his 1987 book ‘Meaning and Force’. 
8
 Notice that an audience is only required to recognise a speaker’s informative intention; he might not believe 
the speaker, in which case the informative intention will be recognised but not fulfilled. By contrast, the 
communicative intention may be fulfilled without being recognised, in that it can be evidenced without the audience 
consciously attending to it. 
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9
 As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, cases of ostension in which the evidence provided for the first 
layer is direct might well be regarded as indirect cases of ostensive-inferential communication. So when I hold up a 
shirt to show you it, I could just as well meanNN ‘I hate every Christmas present Auntie Hilda has ever bought me’ as 
‘Look at this shirt’. Central to my use of the word ‘direct’ in this section is that I use it to describe the nature of the 
evidence provided for the first layer. 
10
 Though see Gibbs (1999, 2001) for a fascinating challenge to the claim that intentions exist solely in the 
minds of individuals. 
11
 I recall psychologist Alan Leslie revealing at a workshop in Oxford a few years ago that it was Grice’s paper 
‘Meaning’ that sparked his interest in belief-desire psychology. 
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